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Tarnishment and the FTDA: Lessening the Capacity 
To Identify and Distinguish 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
(FTDA) in 1995, it declared that the Act was “designed to protect 
famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness 
of the mark or tarnish or disparage it.”1 Subsequently, lower federal 
courts have willingly applied the FTDA to extend trademark 
protection against tarnishment caused by junior uses2 of famous 
marks. In March 2003, however, the Supreme Court, in Moseley v. V 
Secret Catalogue, Inc., questioned whether the tarnishment of 
famous marks by junior uses “is actually embraced by the statutory 
text.”3 The Court’s suggestion “creates substantial doubt about 
whether tarnishment remains actionable under the FTDA.”4
Because the Supreme Court’s argument in Moseley that the 
FTDA does not encompass dilution by tarnishment was dicta,5 the 
door is still open for tarnishment claims under the federal Act.6 
Nevertheless, whereas prior to Moseley the weight of precedent 
supported the inclusion of tarnishment under the FTDA, trademark 
holders who seek protection against tarnishing junior uses of their 
trademarks should now expect a heated debate over whether such 
claims fall within the scope of the FTDA. Thus, in addition to 
 1. Patrick M. Bible, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
295, 307 (1999) (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S19,310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch)). 
 2. A junior use of a trademark occurs when a party, without permission, uses a 
trademark identical or similar to another party’s trademark. 
 3. 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003). 
 4. Courtland L. Reichman & M. Melissa Cannady, The U.S. Supreme Court Dilutes the 
Federal Dilution Statute, 23 FRANCHISE L.J. 24, 29 (2003); see also James R. Higgins, Jr. & 
Scot A. Duvall, The FTDA After Moseley v. V Secret, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 813, 825 (2003) 
(“The Court’s unanimous opinion on the ‘tarnishment’ issue could not give a stronger signal 
to those who would assert tarnishment-based dilution claims . . . .”). 
 5. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432. 
 6. Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (C.D. Ill. 2003) 
(“[Moseley] discussed only blurring, although it did leave open the question of whether 
tarnishment is within the scope of § 43(c).”).
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discussing the application of the “causes dilution” standard set forth 
in Moseley, it is also important to analyze the implications of the 
Court’s brief comments regarding tarnishment. This Comment 
argues that the Supreme Court’s limited analysis of the relevance of 
tarnishment under the FTDA yielded the wrong initial conclusion. 
The FTDA should be interpreted to encompass dilution by 
tarnishment. This interpretation has a textual basis and is consistent 
with congressional intent. 
Tarnishment of a famous trademark occurs when a junior user 
links a mark similar or identical to the famous trademark to products 
of shoddy quality or of an unwholesome nature, such as association 
with drugs, pornography, or sexuality. A classic example of dilution 
by tarnishment occurred in Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment 
Group, Ltd., in which the operator of “candyland.com,” a sexually 
explicit website, was held to have diluted Hasbro’s “Candy Land” 
trademark, which Hasbro used to identify a children’s board game.7 
Tarnishing junior uses of a trademark such as this threaten 
irreparable injury to the hard-earned reputation and goodwill 
associated with the trademark by causing consumers to associate the 
mark with items of unwholesome or inferior quality.  
At first glance, a textual analysis of the FTDA supports “a 
narrower reading of the FTDA” to the exclusion of tarnishment, as 
the Supreme Court suggested.8 Many states have dilution statutes, 
most of which protect against “injury to business reputation” and 
thus clearly encompass tarnishment. The FTDA, however, contains 
no such language. Instead, the FTDA only prohibits the use of a 
mark that lessens “the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services.”9 This omission of any reference to 
injury to business reputation opens the door for the argument that 
tarnishment claims do not fall within the scope of the FTDA and 
should instead be addressed under state dilution statutes or common 
law doctrines. 
The FTDA, however, should be read to encompass tarnishment 
for two reasons. First, tarnishment satisfies the FTDA’s statutory 
 7. Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm’t Group, Ltd., No. C96-130WD, 1996 WL 84853 
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996).
 8. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432 (citing Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The 
Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 812–
13 & n.132 (1997)). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
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language because tarnishing junior uses of a famous mark threaten to 
lessen the capacity of the famous mark to identify and distinguish the 
quality and image of the related goods or services.10 Second, the 
1995 Congress undeniably intended the FTDA to encompass 
tarnishment.11 Therefore, despite the Supreme Court’s dictum in 
Moseley regarding the relevance of tarnishment claims under the 
FTDA and despite the fact that the Trademark Review Commission 
(who originally drafted the legislation) may not have so intended,12 
the FTDA should be interpreted as encompassing dilution by 
tarnishment. 
This Comment discusses the validity of a tarnishment claim 
under the FTDA. Part II provides a brief background and 
description of dilution law and describes the two main types of 
trademark dilution: blurring and tarnishment. It also explains the 
need for a federal law that affords relief for tarnishment claims. Part 
III explores the evolution of dilution law— including the 
introduction of dilution into the legal arena, the passage of dilution 
statutes in state legislatures, and the adoption of the FTDA. This 
Part also explains that, while the original drafters of the language 
ultimately incorporated into the FTDA may not have intended it to 
encompass tarnishment, the legislative history surrounding the 
FTDA clearly demonstrates that the 1995 Congress did intend the 
Act to encompass tarnishment. Part IV discusses the proper 
interpretation of tarnishment under the FTDA, describing past 
judicial treatment of tarnishment and further describing how 
tarnishment fits within dilution theory. This Part also argues that the 
text of the FTDA should be interpreted to encompass tarnishment 
claims and, furthermore, that there is ambiguity in the definition of 
dilution, which necessitates looking to the legislative history of the 
Act. The legislative history clearly reveals that the FTDA should be 
interpreted to include tarnishment claims. Part V concludes that 
dilution by tarnishment should be actionable under the FTDA. 
 10. See infra Part IV.C.3.  
 11. See infra Part III.D. 
 12. See infra Part III.C. 
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II. TRADEMARK DILUTION 
A trademark is a “word, name, symbol, or device” that is used by 
a person to “identify and distinguish his or her goods.”13 The 
primary function of a trademark is “to identify the origin or 
ownership of the goods [or services] to which it is affixed.”14 
Trademarks also serve an invaluable quality-representation function, 
allowing consumers to identify goods and services of a satisfactory 
quality and to reject goods and services of an unsatisfactory quality.15 
To illustrate, by placing the Ford mark on the back of its pickup 
trucks, the Ford Motor Company enables consumers to immediately 
recognize that Ford is the source of the truck. The Ford mark also 
indicates that the truck is of a certain quality, the degree of which is 
determined by the composite of the individual consumer’s past 
experience—both positive and negative—with goods bearing the 
Ford mark. The identifying and the quality- or image-representation 
functions are both essential to a trademark’s value. By protecting 
these functions, trademark law “protects consumers from being 
misled by the use of infringing marks and also protects producers 
from unfair practices by an ‘imitating competitor.’”16
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 14. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813, 813–14 (1927) (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 
(1916)); see also Klieger, supra note 8, at 797–98 (“Producers employed trademarks to 
differentiate their products from those of competitors, and consumers came to rely upon marks 
as indicating the physical source or origin of the goods to which they were attached.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 15. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:3 (4th ed. 2003). McCarthy explains that the use of trademarks promotes 
economic efficiency. He notes: “Microeconomic theory teaches that trademarks perform at 
least two important market functions: (1) they encourage the production of quality products; 
and (2) they reduce the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions.” Id.; 
see also Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark 
Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 957 (2001) (“In a world with [trade]marks . . . consumers can 
easily gauge a product’s quality based on advertising or on the prior performance of items that 
bore the same mark.”); Schechter, supra note 14, at 818 (“The true functions of the trademark 
are, then, to identify a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the 
consuming public.”).
 16. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (citation omitted). 
The Supreme Court suggests that dilution law is “not motivated by an interest in protecting 
consumers,” but rather is motivated only by an interest in protecting trademark owners. Id. at 
429. But see Brian A. Jacobs, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 161, 164–65 (2004) (describing how dilution law also serves “consumer interests by 
protecting the uniqueness of trademarks”). 
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A. The Inadequacy of Trademark Infringement Law 
Trademark holders traditionally have appealed to trademark 
infringement law to protect their marks from misappropriation. To 
establish a successful infringement claim, a plaintiff must show “a 
likelihood of confusion, deception, or mistake on the part of the 
consuming public” concerning the origin, license, or sponsorship of 
the related goods or services.17 Under the modern rule, one of the 
factors weighed to establish a likelihood of confusion is whether the 
junior and senior uses of the mark identify related goods.18 As the 
relatedness, or the proximity, of the goods increases, consumers are 
more likely to suspect that there is some connection or sponsorship 
between the senior and junior uses of the corresponding marks.19 For 
example, the production of a Kodak printer by a company other than 
the Eastman Kodak Company may be actionable, even though 
Kodak does not manufacture printers, because printers are arguably 
related to goods that Kodak does market.20 This relatedness increases 
the likelihood of consumer confusion. On the other hand, it is 
 17. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 2:33; 3 id. § 23:1 (“‘Likelihood of confusion’ is 
the basic test of both common-law trademark infringement and federal statutory trademark 
infringement.” (citations omitted)).
 18. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979) (“If the 
goods are totally unrelated, there can be no infringement because confusion is unlikely.”), 
abrogated on other grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 
n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). The old view of trademark law limited infringement claims to goods that 
competed directly with the trademark owner. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:2; see also, 
e.g., Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 513 (7th Cir. 
1912) (finding that Borden ice cream did not infringe on Borden milk because it would not 
“come into competition with” the milk). However, infringement law has been expanded to 
prevent confusion among related and possibly even nonrelated goods as long as a likelihood of 
confusion of origin, license, or sponsorship can be established. The relatedness or proximity of 
the goods is one of several factors that may contribute to a finding of a likelihood of confusion. 
For example, in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, the court weighed the following eight factors:  
(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) 
evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and 
the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in 
selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.  
599 F.2d at 348–49. 
 19. AMF Inc., 599 F.2d at 350. 
 20. Although Eastman Kodak is most famous for its camera film, the company also 
markets cameras, both analog and digital, and inkjet printer paper. For information regarding 
Eastman Kodak’s products, see http://www.kodak.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2004). With the 
prevalence of digital photography, printers are closely related to several of these Kodak 
products, and thus consumers could reasonably conclude that a Kodak printer is manufactured 
or sponsored by the Eastman Kodak Company. 
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improbable that Kodak could establish a successful infringement 
claim against a hypothetical manufacturer of Kodak pianos because 
the goods for which consumers know Kodak are in no way related to 
pianos, and thus there is a minimal likelihood that consumers would 
believe that the film company manufactured or sponsored the 
pianos.21 Put another way, because film and pianos are in completely 
different product lines, there is little likelihood of confusion of 
source or sponsorship and thus no actionable infringement. 
Trademark infringement law has been criticized for offering 
inadequate protection where trademarks on nonrelated goods or 
services are misappropriated.22 Part of the value of a trademark is its 
distinctiveness.23 Kodak derives substantial value from the fact that 
when people hear the Kodak name they think exclusively of the 
Eastman Kodak Company and its products. However, if Kodak 
pianos were produced and sold in a significant number, consumers 
would no longer associate the Kodak name, in which Eastman Kodak 
has invested millions of dollars, exclusively with the film 
manufacturer. Thus, “[e]ven in the absence of confusion, the 
potency of a mark may be debilitated by another’s use.”24 As the 
potency or distinctiveness of a trademark is diminished, the mark’s 
selling power and value also suffer. 
B. Trademark Dilution 
A new basis of trademark protection, trademark dilution law, has 
slowly evolved over the last seventy-five years in response to the 
inability of traditional infringement law to provide adequate 
protection to trademark owners. This evolution culminated with the 
 21. See infra note 31 and accompanying text discussing the treatment of Kodak pianos 
under the FTDA. 
 22. See, e.g., Beverly M. Pattishall, The Case for Anti-Dilution Trade-Mark Statutes, 43 
TRADEMARK REP. 887, 892 (1953) (arguing that the practical application of the likelihood of 
confusion test provides inadequate protection); Schechter, supra note 14, at 821 (noting that 
protection of marks on noncompeting goods only extends to instances where a likelihood of 
confusion can be shown or where the junior mark will cause “some discredit and financial 
liability or other similar concrete injury”). But see Magliocca, supra note 15, at 978 
(“[I]nfringement protection . . . has expanded so much since the 1920s that dilution has 
become unnecessary.”). 
 23. Schechter, supra note 14, at 819 (“[T]he more distinctive the mark, the more 
effective is its selling power.”). 
 24. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 
(citing Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)). 
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1995 passage of the FTDA, which amended the Lanham Act to 
include a cause of action for dilution.25 Trademark dilution law 
supplements infringement law, providing broader protection to 
famous trademarks.26
The FTDA defines trademark dilution as “the lessening of the 
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or 
services, regardless of the presence or absence of—(1) competition 
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) 
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”27 Thus, federal 
dilution law protects the identifying or distinguishing power of a 
trademark. Congress also described dilution law as protecting the 
“distinctive quality”28 and the “advertising value”29 of famous marks. 
The FTDA protects trademarks against a broader scope of injury 
than does infringement law. Trademark dilution exists even where 
there is no consumer confusion and where the goods or services in 
question are not in competition or related to each other.30 Thus, 
marketing Kodak pianos would constitute actionable trademark 
dilution, despite the fact that the piano maker is not competing with 
the camera producer and creates no consumer confusion. The 
presence of the Kodak piano threatens to lessen the capacity of the 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). 
 26. In contrast to many state dilution laws, the FTDA only protects famous trademarks. 
See infra note 77 and accompanying text for the text of the state laws and 15 U.S.C. § 1125 
for the text of the FTDA. Some courts have further conditioned protection under the FTDA 
upon a showing of distinctiveness. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 
216 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is quite clear that the statute intends distinctiveness, in addition to 
fame, as an essential element.”), overruled on other grounds by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). The Second Circuit has applied the FTDA as follows: 
We understand the FTDA to establish five necessary elements to a claim of dilution: 
(1) the senior mark must be famous; (2) it must be distinctive; (3) the junior use 
must be a commercial use in commerce; (4) it must begin after the senior mark has 
become famous; and (5) it must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior 
mark. 
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215. 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (making injunctive relief available to owners of famous marks 
against junior uses of the mark if such a use “causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the 
mark”). 
 29. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (citing Mortellito, 335 F. Supp. at 1296) (“[D]ilution 
is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the 
mark.”); see also Schechter, supra note 14, at 831 (arguing that “the value of the modern 
trademark lies in its selling power” and that “this selling power depends for its psychological 
hold upon the public . . . upon its own uniqueness and singularity”). 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
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Kodak mark to identify the Eastman Kodak Company because 
consumers who hear the name Kodak may not think exclusively of 
the camera manufacturer. Under the FTDA, this junior use would be 
actionable.31
C. Types of Dilution 
Legislatures, courts, and commentators have struggled to 
provide a definition of dilution that clearly and effectively describes 
the harm associated with dilution. For example, one dilution critic 
noted that “[d]ilution is an amorphous concept, and no antidilution 
statute addresses exactly what dilution is.”32 To assist in clarifying 
this confusion, courts have identified and applied two distinct forms 
of dilution: dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment.33
1. Dilution by blurring 
The traditional form of dilution is a phenomenon known as 
dilution  by blurring.34 Blurring of a famous trademark occurs when 
a junior party uses a mark that is identical or similar to the famous 
mark and this use causes consumers to associate the famous mark 
with multiple sources.35 The distinctiveness or identifying capacity of 
 31. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (noting that the use of Kodak pianos would be 
actionable under the FTDA). 
 32. Klieger, supra note 8, at 794; see also Magliocca, supra note 15, at 953 (“Courts 
repeatedly throw up their hands in frustration when asked ‘to identify the legal interest sought 
to be protected from “dilution,” [and] hence the legal harm sought to be prevented.’” 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Jonathan Moskin, Victoria’s Big Secret: Whither 
Dilution Under the Federal Dilution Act?, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 842, 843 (2003) (noting that 
“we can define dilution but do not know it when we see it”). 
 33. Over the last several years, some courts have also recognized a third type of 
dilution—dilution by cybersquatting—which occurs when a person registers a domain name 
consisting of the mark or name of another company. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 
24:69.1. 
 34. 4 id. § 24:68 (“Dilution by blurring is the classic, or ‘traditional,’ injurious impact 
of the dilution theory as envisioned by its original proponents.”). 
 35. See 4 id. § 24:68 (explaining that blurring occurs when “[c]ustomers or prospective 
customers . . . see the plaintiff’s mark used by other persons to identify other sources on a 
plethora of different goods and services”). The degree of similarity necessary to support a 
dilution claim is a question of fact—the marks must be similar enough for the junior mark to 
cause dilution of the senior mark. The similarity of the marks is a factor that was considered in 
determining whether the junior use of a famous trademark created a likelihood of dilution. See, 
e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part by 
Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). This author believes that this factor is still relevant to proving 
actual dilution as required by Moseley. 
SMI-FIN 7/3/2004 2:21 PM 
825] Tarnishment and the FTDA 
 833 
 
the senior mark is thus diminished. The Kodak piano hypothetical, 
noted above, is an illustration of dilution by blurring in that the 
ability of the Kodak mark to uniquely identify legitimate Eastman 
Kodak products, such as film, is lessened, or blurred, by the junior 
use on pianos. 
2. Dilution by tarnishment 
Tarnishment is “more direct and injurious” than blurring.36 
Whereas dilution by blurring slowly whittles away at a trademark’s 
distinctiveness, dilution by tarnishment “directly assails a consumer’s 
positive evaluation of a mark.”37 Specifically, the tarnishment of a 
trademark occurs when the mark is “portrayed in an unwholesome 
or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the 
owner’s product,”38 such as when it is associated with drugs or 
sexuality.39 Tarnishment can also occur when “the plaintiff’s 
trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality.”40 A tarnishing 
use of a mark threatens to destroy the commercial value of the mark 
“because the public will associate the lack of quality or lack of 
prestige in the defendant’s goods with the plaintiff’s unrelated 
goods, or because the defendant’s use reduces the trademark’s 
reputation and standing in the eyes of consumers as a wholesome 
identifier of the owner’s products or services.”41
A 1962 Florida case provides a classic illustration of dilution by 
tarnishment.42 Chemical Corp. of America manufactured a floor wax 
with a pest control chemical and marketed it using the slogan, 
“Where there’s life . . . there’s bugs,” which was a spin-off of a 
 36. Bible, supra note 1, at 305. 
 37. Id. at 306. Because the tarnishment injury is more palpable, “[d]ilution by 
tarnishment has proven to be somewhat easier to assess than dilution by blurring.” Kathleen E. 
McCarthy, Standards for Proving Dilution in Trademark Cases, 716 PRACTICING L. INST. 483, 
508 (2002). 
 38. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Hormel 
Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The sine qua non of 
tarnishment is a finding that plaintiff’s mark will suffer negative associations through 
[another’s] use.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10066(HB), 2000 
WL 973745, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2000) (finding that a pornographic website, 
barbiesplaypen.com, tarnished the famous Barbie mark). 
 40. Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 43. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Chem. Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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Budweiser Beer slogan, “Where there’s life . . . there’s Bud.”43 
Anheuser-Busch argued that the use of the Budweiser slogan on a 
pest control product infringed the slogan.44 The court held that 
Anheuser-Busch had “a property interest in the slogan, built up at 
great expense,” and agreed that using the slogan on an insecticide 
created a “peculiarly unwholesome association of ideas” that 
threatened to damage the plaintiff’s mark.45 The court thus granted 
Anheuser-Busch’s motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
Chemical Corp. of America’s use of the slogan.46
D. The Need for a Federal Law Prohibiting Tarnishment 
1. Dilution by blurring alone provides insufficient protection for 
trademarks 
Dilution by blurring alone fails to provide adequate protection to 
trademark owners. There is an element of overlap between 
tarnishment and blurring, so in some cases tarnishing junior uses will 
also cause blurring.47 A tarnishing use of a senior mark often 
threatens to lessen the capacity of the senior mark to distinguish the 
goods and services in exactly the same manner as a blurring use.48 
For example, individuals who patronize the pornographic website, 
 43. Id. at 434; see also infra note 121. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 437. Instead of relying on dilution theory, which did not have a foothold in 
the courts in 1962, this court found that a likelihood of confusion existed between the two 
slogans and granted relief based on trademark infringement law. Id. at 438. Nevertheless, the 
policy behind the principles in this case is identical to dilution policy, and the case is illustrative 
of a typical tarnishment fact scenario. 
 46. Id. at 439. 
 47. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:95 (“[T]arnishment necessarily involves 
some degree of probable loss of the capability of the mark to serve as a distinctive identifier.”); 
see also, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725, 728–29 (N.D. Ill. 
1989) (noting that the sale of bubble gum in the form of a white powder with a texture similar 
to cocaine in a bottle closely resembling a Coca-Cola bottle both injured the reputation and 
diluted the source-identifying distinctiveness of the Coca-Cola mark). 
 48. Compare Klieger, supra note 8, at 830 n.239 (“‘Although tarnishment can dilute 
trademark distinctiveness, the typical injury is less dilution than injury to reputation.’”) 
(quoting United States Trademark Association, Trademark Review Commission Report and 
Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 434 
(1987) [hereinafter USTA Report]), with DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: 
FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (2002) (“Tarnishment does not attack the 
distinctiveness of the mark.”). 
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barbiesplaypen.com,49 will likely grow to associate the famous Barbie 
mark with the adult website, thus lessening the ability of the Barbie 
mark to identify and distinguish the dolls from the website. In 
addition to being tarnished, the Barbie mark is thus blurred in the 
minds of the website’s patrons; that is, the Barbie trade name no 
longer serves as a unique source identifier of the toy doll. However, 
due to injury to the mark’s image caused by such tarnishing junior 
uses, any corresponding injury to the mark’s distinctiveness is often 
overlooked.50 Because injury to the mark’s distinctiveness is a slow-
spreading infection51—in contrast to injury to the mark’s reputation, 
which is immediate and direct—the tarnishment of the mark most 
often overshadows the accompanying blurring. For this reason, 
courts often do not arrive at a blurring analysis in tarnishment 
cases.52
One could argue that because any tarnishing junior use of a 
famous trademark involves an element of blurring, a federal cause of 
action for tarnishment is unnecessary. However, holding that the 
FTDA does not encompass tarnishment forces trademark owners to 
wait until a tarnishing junior use gradually whittles away at the 
distinctiveness of their trademark while the mark’s image is ravaged 
by the tarnishing effect of the junior use. This leaves the trademark’s 
image and quality-representation capacity53 vulnerable to irreparable 
injury, especially under an actual dilution standard.54
 49. See Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10066(HB), 2000 WL 
973745 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2000). 
 50. Indeed, in Mattel, Inc. the court briefly mentions blurring, but dedicates its entire 
dilution analysis to tarnishment inflicted by barbiesplaypen.com. Id. at *8. 
 51. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 
(“Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to 
spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (D.C.N.Y. 
1972) (discussing how the slogan “Enjoy Cocaine” threatens to injure the reputation of the 
Coca-Cola trademark, but not mentioning any blurring effect it may have). 
 53. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 54. The injurious effect of waiting until a blurring claim can be established is worsened 
by the application of the “causes dilution” standard after Moseley. Dilution by blurring claims 
will be much more difficult to prove under the new standard, so victims of tarnishment may be 
forced to wait longer until a remedy is available. See infra note 114. 
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2. State dilution statutes and trademark infringement law do not 
provide adequate protection against dilution by tarnishment 
Absent a remedy under the FTDA against dilution by 
tarnishment, trademark owners are left primarily with the insufficient 
protection of state dilution statutes and traditional trademark 
infringement law to fend off tarnishing junior uses.55 It is true that 
trademark holders have experienced some success in applying such 
laws to protect against some tarnishing uses of their trademarks.56 
However, considering the huge investment required to build the 
recognition and goodwill necessary to create a famous trademark, the 
protection afforded by these laws is woefully inadequate.57
One commentator has asserted that tarnishment “can be 
protected without using dilution. The [state] antidilution statutes 
typically contain language protecting against injury to business 
reputation, and in most tarnishment cases there is at least a definable 
injury.”58 Congress directly addressed this argument and expressed 
two concerns about the inadequacy of state laws. First, only about 
thirty states presently have dilution laws that include “injury to 
business reputation” as a cause of action,59 and even within those 
states the “court decisions have been inconsistent.”60 One of 
Congress’s main motivations for enacting the FTDA was its concern 
over the forum shopping and excessive litigation that commonly 
occurred under this regime.61 Congress’s second worry was that the 
existing patchwork of state laws would fail to adequately protect 
 55. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act may provide some relief for mark 
owners whose trademarks are tarnished by junior uses on the Internet. 15 U.S.C. § 1129 
(2000). 
 56. See, e.g., Chem. Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 439 (5th Cir. 
1962) (applying trademark infringement law to grant an injunction in the tarnishment 
context). 
 57. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995) reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 
1030 (“A federal dilution statute is necessary because famous marks ordinarily are used on a 
nationwide basis and dilution protection is currently only available on a patch-quilt system of 
protection . . . .”). 
 58. David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531, 
567 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
 59. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:80. 
 60. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3. 
 61. Id. at 4 (“Protection for famous marks should not depend on whether the forum 
where suit is filed has a dilution statute. This simply encourages forum-shopping and increases 
the amount of litigation.”). 
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businesses operating in a national market.62 An important policy 
objective of the Lanham Act is to secure uniform and defined rights 
for trademark owners in interstate commerce.63 Some courts, 
however, “are reluctant to grant nationwide injunctions for violation 
of state law where half of the states have no dilution law.”64 Thus, 
the inclusion of tarnishment under the FTDA thus brings much 
needed “uniformity and consistency to the protection of famous 
marks.”65
Traditional trademark infringement law also fails to adequately 
protect against the harms caused by most tarnishing uses of famous 
marks.66 Where tarnishing junior uses often occur in different 
product lines, a likelihood of confusion may be difficult to establish. 
As one commentator noted, “without some separate tort such as 
dilution, it would be difficult to fit many tarnishment cases into the 
rubric of confusion.”67
III. THE EVOLUTION OF TRADEMARK DILUTION 
An exploration of the history of trademark dilution sheds light 
on much of the debate over whether tarnishment is actionable under 
the FTDA. 
 62. Brian A. Jacobs, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 161, 168 (2004) (“[E]xisting state antidilution laws provided little aid to businesses 
operating in the national market.”). 
 63. Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National 
Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 285 (1985) (“The legislative history of 
the Lanham Act makes clear that uniformity of trademark law governing the marketing of 
branded merchandise on a national scale was one of the primary objectives of the Lanham 
Act.” (footnote omitted)). 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3–4; see also, e.g., Blue Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers 
Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 731 F.2d 415, 422 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[C]onsiderations of comity 
among the states favor limited out-of-state application of exclusive rights acquired under 
domestic law.”). 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3. 
 66. See supra Part II.A. 
 67. WELKOWITZ, supra note 48, at 96. Some plaintiffs have successfully fended off 
tarnishing uses by establishing a likelihood of confusion, see, e.g., Chem. Corp. of Am. v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 439 (5th Cir. 1962), but in light of the policy of 
protecting famous marks, this is a high hurdle to ask trademark owners to jump. 
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A. The Birth of Dilution Theory 
Frank I. Schechter earned the title “father of the dilution 
theory”68 by introducing trademark dilution theory into U.S. law in 
1927.69 Schechter criticized traditional trademark law for preventing 
only the misappropriation of trademarks where the junior use created 
a likelihood of confusion and where the offending use was on 
products in competition with the senior user’s goods or services.70 
He argued that this limited protection was grossly inadequate in a 
rapidly evolving economy, pointing out that the “use of trademarks 
on entirely non-related goods may of itself concretely injure the 
owner of the mark,” even in the absence of source confusion.71 
Schechter described the injury that such noncompeting uses 
potentially caused as “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the 
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark.”72 This injury is 
significant to trademark holders because “the value of the modern 
trademark lies in its selling power” and the selling power of a mark 
depends upon the mark’s “uniqueness or singularity.”73 Schechter 
concluded that “the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark 
should constitute the only rational basis for its protection.”74
B. State Dilution Statutes 
Schechter’s dilution proposal failed to gain immediate 
momentum in courts or Congress,75 but trademark dilution 
eventually gained a foothold in the state legislatures. In 1947, 
Massachusetts passed the first state law protecting against dilution, 
stating: 
 68. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1028 
(2d Cir. 1989). 
 69. See Schechter, supra note 14. 
 70. Id. at 825; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000); Moseley v. V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (citing Schechter, supra note 14, at 831); Klieger, supra 
note 8, at 792 (“[T]rademark law has traditionally protected the senior user of a mark against 
use of the same mark by another only insofar as is necessary to prevent public deception.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 71. Schechter, supra note 14, at 825. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 831. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Schechter encouraged the introduction of a bill proposing a federal dilution law into 
Congress in 1932, but Congress declined to enact the legislation. WELKOWITZ, supra note 48, 
at 11–12. 
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Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the 
distinctive quality of a trade name or trade-mark shall be a ground 
for injunctive relief in cases of trade-mark infringement or unfair 
competition notwithstanding the absence of competition between 
the parties or of confusion as to the source of goods or services.76
The United States Trademark Association incorporated the text 
of the Massachusetts law into the Model State Trademark Bill of 
1968,77 which provided a pattern for other state legislatures to use in 
crafting dilution laws. Approximately thirty other states enacted 
dilution legislation, and most of those states modeled their statutes 
after the Model State Trademark Bill prior to the enactment of the 
FTDA in 1995.78
The division of dilution into the categories of blurring and 
tarnishment occurred as courts interpreted these state dilution 
statutes. A few courts have explicitly based these categorizations on 
the language of the statutes, holding that dilution by tarnishment is 
actionable under the phrase “injury to business reputation”79 and 
 76. 1947 Mass. Acts 300. 
 77. The Model State Trademark Bill provides:  
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of 
a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade name 
valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the 
absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the 
source of goods or services.  
United States Trademark Association Model State Trademark Bill § 12 (1964), reprinted in 4 
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:80 (footnote omitted). A few states, however, have enacted 
dilution legislation that follows the same model as the FTDA. The Washington dilution 
statute, for example, requires a showing that the junior use “causes dilution of the distinctive 
quality of the mark” and does not contain language explicitly prohibiting “injury to business 
reputation.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.160 (West 2003); see also WELKOWITZ, supra 
note 48, at 18 n.116. 
 78. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:80 (“Many state anti-dilution statutes are 
modeled on the language contained in Section 12 of the 1964 United States (now 
International) Trademark Association Model State Trademark Bill.”). 
 79. Accuride Int’l, Inc. v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(“Injury to business reputation is typically invoked where the plaintiff’s mark or name is 
tarnished or degraded through association with something unsavory.”); Scholastic, Inc. v. 
Stouffer, 221 F. Supp. 2d 425, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (classifying “injury to business 
reputation” as tarnishment under the New York dilution statute); N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. 
N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 479, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“While cases generally 
have not specified the particular language in the New York ‘antidilution’ statute that makes 
tarnishment actionable, a claim of tarnishment is better understood as arising from a 
‘[l]ikelihood of injury to business reputation’ rather than from a likelihood of ‘dilution of the 
distinctive quality of a mark.’” (alteration in original)), rev’d in part on other grounds, 293 F.3d 
550 (2d Cir. 2002); Glen Raven Mills, Inc. v. Ramada Int’l, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 1544, 1556 
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that dilution by blurring is actionable under the phrase “dilution of 
the distinctive quality.”80 Nevertheless, the majority of courts have 
not recognized the statutory distinction between tarnishment and 
blurring, but instead “simply group tarnishment with other forms of 
dilution.”81 Under this view, tarnishment claims are not dependent 
on the phrase “injury to business reputation.”82
C. The Intent Behind the 1988 Federal Dilution Bill 
The definition of dilution contained in the FTDA originated in 
the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988,83 an amendment to the 
Lanham Act.84 The Trademark Review Commission of the United 
States Trademark Association drafted the dilution proposal, which 
provided: “The registrant of a famous mark . . . shall be entitled, 
subject to the principles of equity, to an injunction against another’s 
use in commerce of a mark, commencing after the registrant’s mark 
becomes famous, which causes dilution of the distinctive quality of 
(M.D. Fla. 1994) (“Injury to business reputation may also be established by tarnishment.”); 
Sakura Japanese Steakhouse Inc. v. Lin Yan, Inc., 827 So. 2d 1105, 1107 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 
2002) (noting that “dilution of the distinctive quality” occurs when a junior user “uses a 
designation which resembles the highly distinctive trade name of another in a manner likely to 
cause a reduction in the distinctiveness of the other’s trade name”); Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. 
Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 382 (Or. 1983) (noting that tarnishment “may be recognized in [the 
Oregon statute] as ‘likelihood of injury to business reputation’”). 
 80. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio Del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 469 
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (“‘[T]arnishment’ is required in showing a ‘likelihood of injury to business 
reputation’ under the first prong of [the California dilution statute].”); Sakura Japanese 
Steakhouse Inc., 827 So. 2d at 1107 (explaining that under the Florida dilution statute, “injury 
to business reputation” may be established by showing “tarnishment of the business 
reputation”). 
 81. WELKOWITZ, supra note 48, at 96; 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:95 
(“[C]ourts under the state statutes have not explicitly conditioned relief from dilution by 
tarnishment on the presence of the phrase ‘likelihood of injury to business reputation’ in state 
statutes.”); see also, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 507–08 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (not referring directly to the phrase “injury to business reputation” in analyzing 
tarnishment under New York dilution law). Professor McCarthy advocates grouping 
tarnishment with other forms of dilution. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:80 (“[T]he 
phrase ‘injury to business reputation’ does not stand alone as an alternative to ‘dilution of the 
distinctive quality of a mark,’ but the statute must be read as if it said ‘injury to business 
reputation . . . of the distinctive quality of a mark.’”); 4 id. (“No court has explored whether 
or not ‘injury to business reputation’ of a mark is in any way different from ‘dilution’ of a 
mark.”). 
 82. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 83. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 84. WELKOWITZ, supra note 48, at 230–32. 
SMI-FIN 7/3/2004 2:21 PM 
825] Tarnishment and the FTDA 
 841 
 
the registrant’s mark . . . .”85 The Commission’s proposal defined 
dilution as “the lessening of the capacity of the registrant’s mark to 
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence 
or absence of (a) competition between the parties, or (b) likelihood 
of confusion, mistake or deception.”86
The Review Commission apparently did not intend the definition 
of dilution to include tarnishment as a cause of action. The 
Commission instead viewed tarnishment as a separate wrong and 
proposed a separate amendment to Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act87 to include a cause of action for “any act, trade practice, or 
course of conduct, which . . . is likely to disparage or tarnish the 
mark of another.”88 Presumably, because the Commission 
recommended this separate remedy for tarnishment, it did not 
include the phrase “injury to business reputation” in its suggested 
definition of dilution.  
The Commission’s recommended legislation was included 
“almost verbatim” in the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988.89 
Ultimately, however, Congress enacted neither the tarnishment 
provision nor the dilution portion of the bill. Rather, the Senate 
eliminated the tarnishment section, leaving tarnishment claims to be 
decided under trademark infringement law.90 Also, due to concerns 
over potential conflicts with first amendment rights, the House-
Senate Conference Committee deleted the dilution provision from 
the 1988 Act.91
The fact that the Trademark Review Commission included 
separate provisions for tarnishment and dilution in its proposal, 
coupled with the fact that it excluded the phrase “injury to business 
 85. USTA Report, supra note 48, at 458. 
 86. Id. at 459. 
 87. Id. at 455 n.134 (“The Commission believes that trademark tarnishment and 
disparagement are a separate form of legal wrong, and recommends amending Section 43(a) to 
deal with them.”); see also WELKOWITZ, supra note 48, at 230–32. 
 88. USTA Report, supra note 48, at 435. 
 89. Klieger, supra note 8, at 837 (citing Jerome Gilson, A Federal Dilution Statute: Is it 
Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 108, 114 (1993)). 
 90. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Comm. 
on the Judiciary on S. 1883, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1998) (explaining that “[i]t is the 
committee’s contention that tarnishment and disparagement . . . should continue to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis, and that the amendments it made to the legislation regarding 
[this] issue should not be regarded as either limiting or extending applicable decisional law”). 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1028, at 6–7 (1988), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 
1033–34; see also WELKOWITZ, supra note 48, at 233; Klieger, supra note 8, at 837. 
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reputation” from the definition of dilution, seems to indicate that 
the Commission—and presumably the 1988 Congress—did not 
intend its definition of dilution to encompass tarnishment.92
D. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
Seven years later, in 1995, Congress enacted the FTDA.93 The 
definition of dilution adopted in the FTDA was almost identical to 
the definition in the 1988 proposal.94 The 1995 Act defined dilution 
as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence 
of—(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and 
other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or 
deception.”95
While the definition of dilution in the 1995 bill did not differ 
materially from the definition contained in the previous bill, 
Congress’s understanding of that definition changed dramatically. 
Even though the Trademark Review Commission may not have 
crafted the definition of dilution to include tarnishment, Congress 
viewed the FTDA as “encompass[ing] all forms of dilution 
recognized by the courts, including dilution by blurring, by 
tarnishment and disparagement, and by diminishment.”96 The scope 
of this definition had mysteriously expanded to encompass dilution 
by tarnishment. 
 92.  WELKOWITZ, supra note 48, at 232 (“[I]t appears that the Senate did not intend to 
include tarnishment in the definition of dilution.”). 
 93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (2000). 
 94. One of the few differences between the FTDA and the 1988 dilution proposal is 
that the first amendment concerns that plagued the 1988 dilution proposal were eliminated by 
placing two limitations on the application of the FTDA to noncommercial uses of trademarks. 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (explaining how the constitutional concerns were resolved in the 
FTDA by allowing for “noncommercial expression” and “fair use of a mark”). Absent the 
constitutional concerns, the dilution legislation was passed with little opposition. The House 
and the Senate both passed the FTDA without any major obstacles. The Senate passed the Act 
without any hearings or any floor debate. Klieger, supra note 8, at 839. 
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The only difference between the 1988 definition of dilution and 
the FTDA definition is that the phrase “the registrant’s mark” was replaced with the phrase “a 
famous mark.” See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 76–78 and 
accompanying text (describing the development of state dilution statutes). This change 
expanded dilution protection to include famous marks that are not federally registered. See 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4. 
 96.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 8 (emphasis added). 
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That Congress intended to include tarnishment in the FTDA’s 
definition of dilution is repeatedly evidenced in the FTDA’s 
legislative history. The House Committee on the Judiciary declared 
that “[t]he purpose of [the FTDA] is to protect famous trademarks 
from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or 
tarnish or disparage it.”97 On the floor of the House, Representative 
Carlos J. Moorhead, who introduced the bill, declared: “[T]his bill is 
designed to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that 
blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it . . . .”98 
On the Senate floor, Senator Orrin Hatch stated: “[T]his bill is 
designed to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that 
blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in 
the absence of a likelihood of confusion.”99 These comments in the 
legislative history clearly demonstrate that when the 1995 Congress 
voted in favor of the FTDA, it fully intended to include a cause of 
action for tarnishment.100  
The issue of whether tarnishment fits within the FTDA 
definition of dilution was raised at least once before Congress. 
Jonathan E. Moskin testified before the House Committee on the 
Judiciary that “[the FTDA] does not purport to recognize injury 
from uses of a famous trademark that are likely to tarnish the 
reputation of the owner of the famous mark.”101 In light of this 
 97. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 98. 141 CONG. REC. H14,317 (1995) (emphasis added). The scope of the FTDA was 
not discussed on the floor of the Senate. 141 CONG. REC. S19,312 (1995). 
 99. 141 CONG. REC. S19,312 (1995). Also, when a Warner Brothers representative 
testified at a House hearing on the bill, he used the example of a t-shirt with a picture of Bugs 
Bunny smoking marijuana, a classic example of the tarnishing of the Bugs Bunny mark, as an 
example of actionable dilution. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:95 n.10 (citation omitted) 
(describing the proceedings of the hearing). 
 100. Bible, supra note 1, at 307 (“[L]egislators intended the Act to encompass the 
tarnishment theory of dilution.” (footnote omitted)); WELKOWITZ, supra note 48, at 233 (“At 
least in the view of the House committee, the FTDA definition, though essentially unchanged 
from the . . . 1988 Senate bill[], now encompasses all recognized forms of dilution . . . .”). 
Professor Welkowitz noted that one witness testifying before the House Committee on the 
Judiciary raised the point that the bill did not encompass tarnishment, but Welkowitz 
nevertheless concluded that “it is clear that Congress believed that the definition included 
tarnishment.” Id. at 260 (comparing Testimony of Mary Ann Alford, Executive Vice President 
of the International Trademark Association, July 19, 1995, 1995 WL 435750 (F.D.C.H.), 
with Testimony of Jonathan E. Moskin, Pennie & Edmonds, July 19, 1995, 1995 WL 437437 
(F.D.C.H.)). 
 101. Testimony of Jonathan E. Moskin, Pennie & Edmonds, July 19, 1995, 1995 WL 
437437 (F.D.C.H.). 
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testimony, it is probable that the Committee considered the question 
and determined that the statutory language sufficiently incorporated 
tarnishment claims.102 The congressional record, unfortunately, does 
not confirm this conclusion, nor does it reveal exactly how to read 
tarnishment into the FTDA definition of dilution.103
The preceding discussion reveals that there is some doubt over 
how Congress intended the language of the FTDA to encompass 
dilution by tarnishment. Even though the Trademark Review 
Commission may not have intended its dilution definition to include 
tarnishment, it is important to note that the 1995 Congress that 
passed the FTDA fully believed that the dilution definition 
encompassed tarnishment. In determining the scope of federal 
legislation, courts should look to the intent of the Congress that 
passed the bill and not to the intent of the drafters, where the two 
conflict. Federal courts that have heard tarnishment claims under the 
FTDA have done exactly that, appealing to the evidence of 
congressional intent contained in the 1995 legislative history to 
support the holding that tarnishment is a valid claim under the 
FTDA.104
E. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. Shakes  
Up the Tarnishment Debate 
Until 2003, there was little controversy over the scope of the 
FTDA as it relates to tarnishment.105 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 
Inc. provided a spark that will likely ignite the debate over the scope 
of the FTDA in the courts. Victor and Kathy Moseley owned and 
operated a small boutique called “Victor’s Little Secret” in a strip 
mall in Elizabethtown, Kentucky.106 The store sold a variety of 
 102. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 103. Because Congress approved the FTDA with so little debate, see supra note 93, it left 
a relatively scant legislative record. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, A Circus Among the Circuits, 1 J. 
INTELL. PROP. 158, 161 (2000) (“The Act was passed with a strong reception from Congress 
and with sparse legislative history.”). 
 104. See infra Part IV.A. 
 105. See infra Part IV.A. 
 106. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 424 (2003). The shop was 
originally named “Victor’s Secret.” Id. at 423. Prior to filing suit, counsel for Victoria’s Secret 
requested that the store discontinue use of the name Victor’s Secret and any variation thereof, 
arguing that it was likely to cause confusion and to dilute the distinctiveness of the famous 
Victoria’s Secret mark. Id. The Moseleys responded by changing the name of their store to 
“Victor’s Little Secret.” Id. Unsatisfied by this submission, Victoria’s Secret filed suit. Id.  
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products, including lingerie and adult novelties.107 Victoria’s Secret 
filed an action in federal district court alleging, among other claims, 
dilution of its trademark by blurring and tarnishment.108 The Sixth 
Circuit found that the defendants’ shop both blurred and tarnished 
the Victoria’s Secret mark,109 and the Moseleys sought review in the 
U.S. Supreme Court.110
1. Actual dilution versus likelihood of confusion 
The Supreme Court granted review to resolve a circuit split111 
over whether a dilution claim required a showing of actual dilution 
or a likelihood of dilution.112 The Supreme Court’s analysis in 
holding that the FTDA requires an actual dilution standard is 
valuable to the tarnishment discussion because it parallels the 
tarnishment issue and provides some insight into the Court’s current 
trademark tarnishment jurisprudence. The Court first noted that the 
FTDA provides that “‘the owner of a famous mark’ is entitled to 
injunctive relief against [a junior use of the mark] if that use ‘causes 
dilution of the distinctive quality’ of the famous mark”113 and, 
therefore, concluded that the “text [of the FTDA] unambiguously 
requires a showing of actual dilution.”114 The Court supported this 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 424. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc. and the other respondents are “affiliated 
corporations that own the Victoria’s Secret trademarks.”  Id. at 418. 
 109. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 477 (6th Cir. 2001) (“This, 
then is a classic instance of dilution by tarnishing (associating the Victoria’s Secret name with 
sex toys and lewd coffee mugs) and by blurring (linking the chain with a single, unauthorized 
establishment).”). 
 110. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 259 F.3d 464, petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 2, 2002) 
(No. 01-1015), available at 2002 WL 32101173.  
 111. Compare Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the FTDA only requires a showing of likelihood of dilution), overruled in part by 
Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (2003), with Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. 
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the FTDA 
requires a showing of actual dilution), overruled in part by Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 112. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 421–22 (“The question we granted certiorari to decide is 
whether objective proof of actual injury to the economic value of a famous mark (as opposed 
to a presumption of harm arising from a subjective ‘likelihood of dilution’ standard) is a 
requisite for relief under the FTDA.”). 
 113. Id. at 432–33 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (emphasis added)). 
 114. Id. at 433. Until 2003, there was a circuit split over the proper standard for proving 
dilution by blurring, specifically whether it requires a showing of actual dilution or whether a 
showing of a mere likelihood of dilution is sufficient. See supra note 112 and accompanying 
text. In Moseley, the Supreme Court held an actual dilution standard proper under the FTDA. 
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conclusion via an appeal to the “contrast between the state statutes . 
. . and the federal statute,”115 noting that state statutes, unlike the 
FTDA, “repeatedly refer to a ‘likelihood’ of harm.”116 Interestingly, 
in its opinion, the Court failed to address appeals to the legislative 
history in support of the likelihood of dilution standard.117
537 U.S. at 418. The Supreme Court’s opinion, however, failed to decisively explain exactly 
what it means to “cause dilution” or how to prove it. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 
287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (noting that “it is unclear what type of showing 
Caterpillar must make” to prove actual dilution); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:94.2 
(discussing dilution law after Moseley). Plaintiffs asserting dilution claims now bear a greater 
burden of proof than they previously enjoyed under a likelihood of dilution standard. 
The new dilution standard presumably applies equally to both blurring and tarnishment 
claims. Caterpillar Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (noting that the Moseley holding applied 
specifically to blurring claims and “[a]ssuming that actual dilution must be shown for 
tarnishment cases”). Most of the debate over the proper means of proving dilution seems to 
have occurred in the blurring realm. In the case of tarnishment, courts have not struggled 
nearly as much to identify and accept evidence of dilution. See McCarthy, supra note 37, at 
508 (“Dilution by tarnishment has proven to be somewhat easier to assess than dilution by 
blurring.”). This is probably attributable to the fact that the tarnishment injury is conceptually 
simple when compared to the blurring injury. It is easier to understand the harm resulting 
from a soiled reputation than that resulting from a lessening of distinctiveness. To illustrate, at 
oral argument one justice admitted, “I don't understand conceptually how there ever could be 
an injury,” due to blurring, but also noted that “I can imagine an injury through tarnishment.” 
Oral Argument at *6, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 71 U.S.L.W. 3366, 2002 WL 
31643067 [hereinafter Oral Argument]; see also, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey 
Combined Shows, Inc., 170 F.3d at 451 (referring to dilution as a “dauntingly elusive concept” 
in a case involving blurring), overruled in part by Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
For further discussion on how to apply the Moseley actual dilution standard, see 4 
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:94.2 (discussing the actual dilution standard, including how 
expert testimony may be used to establish a tarnishment claim); Susan Turcotte, Caught in a 
Corporate Panty Raid: Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 40 HOUS. L. REV. 867, 888–901 
(2003) (discussing what “actual harm” is and how to prove it); Thomas R. Lee, Demystifying 
Dilution, 84 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2004). 
 115. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432.  
 116. Id. 
 117. The Sixth Circuit, in V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, held that a likelihood of 
dilution requirement “follows more closely Congress’s intent in enacting the FTDA.” 259 
F.3d 464, 475 (6th Cir. 2001), vacated by 537 U.S. 418 (2003). The Sixth Circuit explained: 
Legislative history surrounding the statute’s enactment demonstrates that the 
legislators were attempting to ensure that plaintiffs could find a nationwide remedy 
for dilution claims, as distinct from the Lanham Act’s established protection for 
trademark infringement. As the Congressional Record indicates, dilution is “an 
injury that differs materially from that arising out of the orthodox confusion. Even 
in the absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated by another’s 
use. This is the essence of dilution. Confusion leads to immediate injury, while 
dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the 
advertising value of the mark.” 
SMI-FIN 7/3/2004 2:21 PM 
825] Tarnishment and the FTDA 
 847 
 
2. The Supreme Court’s tarnishment comment 
The Supreme Court, in dicta, also applied a similar analysis to the 
tarnishment issue, arguing that it should not be actionable under the 
FTDA.118 The crux of the Court’s position was the absence of the 
phrase “injury to business reputation” in the FTDA. The Court 
explained that the Moseleys 
have not disputed the relevance of tarnishment, . . . presumably 
because that concept was prominent in litigation brought under 
state antidilution statutes and because it was mentioned in the 
legislative history. Whether it is actually embraced by the statutory 
text, however, is another matter. Indeed, the contrast between the 
state statutes, which expressly refer to both “injury to business 
reputation” and to “dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade 
name or trademark,” and the federal statute which refers only to 
the latter, arguably supports a narrower reading of the FTDA.119
The Court does not conduct a direct analysis of the text of the 
FTDA, nor of what that text “actually embrace[s],” to support its 
position. Instead, the Court only appeals to the contrast between 
state and federal statutes as an indication that the federal statute does 
not include dilution by tarnishment. The Court seems to place little 
weight on the indications in the legislative history that Congress 
intended to include tarnishment as a cause of action.120 In sum, the 
Court’s sole comment concerning tarnishment is far from a 
thorough analysis of the issue and does little more than introduce 
the Court’s initial view that tarnishment claims may not be 
supported by the text of the FTDA. 
3. Comments on legislative history at oral argument 
At oral argument in Moseley, several justices questioned whether 
the FTDA encompassed tarnishment.121 Walter Dellinger, the 
Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1032). 
The Supreme Court did not respond to this argument in its opinion. See infra note 157. 
 118. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432. 
 119. Id. The Court also noted that it believed that the text of the Massachusetts dilution 
law “expressly applied to both ‘tarnishment’ and ‘blurring.’” Id. at 430. 
 120. See infra Part III.C.3, discussing the Court’s discussion of the legislative history at 
oral argument, and Part IV.C.1, discussing the plain meaning rule.  
 121. One justice posed the following question: 
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Solicitor General, posed two responses to this question. First, he 
explained that trademarks serve a quality-identifying purpose122 and  
that tarnishment lessens the capacity of the mark to serve that 
purpose.123 Second, Mr. Dellinger argued that when the FTDA 
employed the word “dilution,” it was using the word “as a term of 
art” to encompass both blurring and tarnishment.124 One justice 
disagreed with Mr. Dellinger’s argument, asserting that the 
“definition of ‘dilution’ does not at all cover disparaging the other 
product.”125 Mr. Dellinger responded that “Congress thought 
otherwise” and alluded to House Report 104–374.126 A justice 
quickly countered: “What Congress thought was the definition that 
Congress adopted.”127
[I]t would help me a lot if you explained to me what dilution is, and I’ll be specific. 
It seems to me what you have here is a case of what’s called tarnishment, and what 
tarnishment—what I think of is this, is it like this, that—that—imagine some small 
shop wants to start a bug spray business. It’s a funny example, but it comes from an 
actual case, and they decide to call themselves Bugwiser Bug Spray, and their slogan 
is, Where there’s life, there’s bugs, all right. . . . Now, Budweiser is not going to 
enter the bug spray business. Nobody thinks Budweiser, in fact, is the source of the 
bug spray, but Budweiser has an interest because the people who see this ad are 
going to think Budweiser, Yuck, and they don’t want people to think that. Now, is 
dilution encompassed? Does dilution encompass that, and my reason for thinking 
maybe it doesn’t is, the words of the statute refer to distinctiveness of mark. They 
don’t refer to tarnishment. But—is it—so I want some explanation of what dilution 
here refers to. 
Oral Argument, supra note 114, at *4–5. This question was not immediately answered, so later 
in oral argument at least two justices posed the same question again: 
QUESTION: But how does tarnishment fit the language of the statute? That’s 
what— 
QUESTION: Yes, I’d like to know that, too. I don’t see how tarnishment—you 
know— 
QUESTION: Does that lessen the capacity of the mark to identify[?] 
Id. at *32. 
 122. For more information regarding the quality-identifying role of trademarks, see supra 
note 15 and accompanying text. 
 123. Oral Argument, supra note 114, at *32–33; see also infra Part IV.C.3. 
 124. Id. at *34. This argument is consistent with the explanation in the House Report 
that the dilution definition “is designed to encompass all forms of dilution recognized by the 
courts, including dilution by blurring, by tarnishment and disparagement, and by 
diminishment.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 
1035. 
 125. Oral Argument, supra note 114, at *34. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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F. The Reaction to Moseley 
The Supreme Court’s comment in dicta regarding tarnishment 
“could not give a stronger signal” to trademark holders that 
tarnishment claims may no longer be valid under the FTDA.128 To 
date, however, no court since Moseley has addressed the issue.129 
Nevertheless, Moseley is still fresh, and very few tarnishment cases 
have tested the waters. The Supreme Court’s preliminary position on 
the issue undoubtedly opens the door for the validity of tarnishment 
claims under the FTDA to be hotly litigated in the lower courts. 
IV. HOW TARNISHMENT LESSENS THE CAPACITY  
TO IDENTIFY AND DISTINGUISH 
If the Supreme Court were to apply the same reasoning to the 
tarnishment issue as it did to the dilution standard issue, tarnishment 
might be squeezed out of the FTDA. That is, if the Court were to 
rely on the distinction between the pertinent state and federal 
statutes and refuse to look to the legislative history,130 it might 
confirm its initial position in Moseley. However, there are two key 
differences in the two debates. First, in the analysis of the dilution 
standard, the Court was able to rely on the positive presence of the 
phrase “causes dilution” in the text, whereas to exclude tarnishment 
would require a showing that the concept of tarnishment is not 
consistent with the text of the FTDA.131 Second, the legislative 
record is foggy on whether Congress intended a likelihood of 
 128. Higgins & Duval, supra note 4, at 825 (“The Court’s unanimous opinion on the 
‘tarnishment’ issue could not give a stronger signal to those who would assert tarnishment-
based dilution claims.”); see also Reichman & Cannady, supra note 4, at 29 (“[T]he Court’s 
dicta creates substantial doubt about whether tarnishment remains actionable under the 
FTDA.”). 
 129. At least one circuit court has heard a tarnishment claim since Moseley without 
addressing the validity of tarnishment under the FTDA. The Central District of Illinois heard 
and denied a motion for a preliminary injunction against Disney’s allegedly tarnishing use of 
the Caterpillar tractor mark in the movie “George of the Jungle 2,” holding that Caterpillar 
failed to show it could prove actual dilution. Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 
2d 913, 922 (C.D. Ill. 2003). The court noted that Moseley “did leave open the question of 
whether tarnishment is within the scope of § 43(c),” but the court did not attempt to delve 
into the issue. Id. 
 130. See supra Part III.E.1.  
 131. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
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dilution or an actual dilution standard,132 but it is clear that the 1995 
Congress intended the FTDA definition of dilution to encompass 
tarnishment.133 These facts considered, the unresolved question is 
whether dilution by tarnishment causes “the lessening of the capacity 
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,”134 
and thus whether there is sufficient ambiguity in the text of the 
FTDA to justify an appeal to the legislative history in determining 
the proper scope of the federal Act.135
A. Judicial Treatment of the FTDA in the Federal Courts 
In interpreting the FTDA, federal courts have consistently relied 
on the Act’s legislative history to hold that its dilution definition 
encompasses tarnishment.136 For example, in Mattel, Inc. v. Internet 
Dimensions Inc.,137 Mattel sought to enjoin the defendant from 
operating a pornographic website under the name 
barbiesplaypen.com.138 The court issued a preliminary injunction 
based in part on dilution by tarnishment under the FTDA, declaring 
that “[t]he legislative history of the Act indicates that its purpose is 
‘to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the 
distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the 
absence of a likelihood of confusion.’”139
 132. The House Report never explicitly mentions an intent to formulate either a 
“likelihood of dilution” or an “actual dilution” standard, but the legislative history contains 
several comments that indicate a positive intent to include tarnishment in the definition of 
dilution. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029. 
 133. See supra Part III.C. 
 134. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
 135. See supra Part III.C–D for a discussion of the legislative history as it relates to 
tarnishment. At least one Supreme Court justice at oral argument in Moseley portrayed a 
reluctance to look beyond the language of the statute to determine congressional intent. See 
supra text accompanying note 127. 
 136. WELKOWITZ, supra note 48, at 234 (“[M]ost federal courts have assumed that the 
FTDA definition incorporates the concept of tarnishment.”). 
 137. No. 99 Civ. 10066(HB), 2000 WL 973745 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2000). 
 138. Id. at *9.  
 139. Id. at *7 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030); see also Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 790, 
797 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 to support the conclusion that the 
FTDA does “not distinguish between” tarnishment and dilution, but instead “encompasses 
both”); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, No. C 96-3381 CW, 1996 WL 772709 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 29, 1996) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 to support a finding that a pornographic 
“Adults ‘R’ Us” website tarnished the “Toys ‘R’ Us” mark under the FTDA). 
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One court of appeals, however, questioned the validity of a 
tarnishment claim under the FTDA even before Moseley. The Fourth 
Circuit, in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. 
Utah Department of Travel Development, heard a dilution by blurring 
claim and noted that because tarnishment was not an issue in the 
case, it would not “delve into the difficult question of how 
conceptually to fit tarnishment within a theory of dilution.”140
B. Tarnishment Is Consistent with Dilution Theory 
The Fourth Circuit was somewhat justified in questioning how 
tarnishment fits within dilution theory. Indeed, dilution theory, as 
described by Schechter, focuses on protecting the ability of 
trademarks to identify a single source,141 and tarnishment may not 
pose a direct threat to that ability.142 Nevertheless, there are at least 
two congruencies between dilution theory and tarnishment. First, 
tarnishment fits within Schechter’s oft-quoted description of dilution 
injury as being “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the 
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark.”143 Part of a 
mark’s hold upon the public mind includes the reputation and good 
will associated with the mark.144 To illustrate, seeing a t-shirt with a 
picture of Bugs Bunny smoking marijuana is apt to negatively affect 
an individual’s perception of the Warner Brothers cartoon 
character.145 Because the primary Bugs Bunny market is children and 
families, an innocent and wholesome nature may be an essential 
element of the image Warner Brothers desires. As Bugs Bunny’s 
reputation is tarnished, the trademark’s hold upon the minds of 
members of the intended Warner Brothers market is whittled away, 
not because the Bugs Bunny mark brings to mind a multiplicity of 
sources, but because the mark brings to mind a multiplicity of 
 140. 170 F.3d 449, 452 n.1 (4th Cir. 1999).  
 141. Schechter’s arguments and examples in The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection 
are directed towards protecting a trademark’s ability to serve as a unique source identifier. 
Schechter, supra note 14. 
 142. See supra Part II.C.2 and Part II.C.3. 
 143. Schechter, supra note 14, at 825. Judging by the context of this statement, 
Schechter was referring to the whittling away of a mark’s uniqueness. Id. (noting also that 
“[t]he more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public 
consciousness”). 
 144. See supra note 15 and accompanying text, describing the quality-representation role 
of trademarks. 
 145. See supra note 99. 
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quality representations or images. A second congruency is that an 
essential motivator behind dilution theory is protecting the “selling 
power” of trademarks.146 Assuredly, the reputation-damaging injury 
caused by tarnishment poses a direct and serious threat to a 
trademark’s selling power. As consumers’ perception of a trademark 
deteriorates, the likelihood that they will purchase the goods or 
services it identifies decreases. 
Some commentators have argued that tarnishment is not 
consistent with Schechter’s dilution theory because the injury is not 
gradual.147 This argument relies on an unwarranted focus on the 
term “gradual.” The typically gradual nature of the dilution by 
blurring injury is not a necessary element of a blurring claim. It 
makes no sense to reject a dilution by blurring claim solely because a 
junior, diluting use of a famous mark was so sweeping that it 
immediately caused dilution of the distinctive quality of the famous 
mark. Immediate blurring is still dilution. Similarly, it would be 
unreasonable to deny relief for tarnishment merely because the injury 
is not gradual. Describing dilution as a “gradual” phenomenon is 
intended to allow mark owners to protect against nonimmediate 
harms, not to prevent the protection against immediate injury. 
Moreover, because the term “gradual” is not included in the FTDA’s 
definition of dilution,148 this argument has little weight in 
determining whether tarnishment should be actionable under the 
Act. 
C. Textual Interpretation of the FTDA 
In interpreting any statute, a court must first look to the statute’s 
plain language. The text of the FTDA definition clearly encompasses 
the theory of dilution by blurring;149 however, the Supreme Court’s 
 146. Schechter, supra note 14, at 831. 
 147. Jason R. Edgecombe, Off the Mark: Bringing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in 
Line with Established Trademark Law, 51 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1279 (2002) (“[I]f the harm in 
dilution is understood as the gradual diminishing of a mark’s selling power, then tarnishment is 
not really dilution at all, since it causes an immediate injury to the trademark.” (footnote 
omitted)); Klieger, supra note 8, at 830 (“If the aim of dilution law is to prevent the gradual 
whittling away of trademark value . . . then tarnishment should not qualify as dilution at all. 
Tarnishment causes a much more immediate and direct injury to the senior user.”). 
 148. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
 149. Dilution by blurring clearly threatens to lessen “the capacity of a famous mark to 
identify and distinguish goods or services,” 15 U.S.C. § 1127, in that blurring poses a direct 
threat to a mark’s source-identifying capacity. See Bible, supra note 1, at 307 (noting that the 
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Moseley decision has raised substantial doubt concerning the ability to 
fit dilution by tarnishment into the language of the federal Act. 
Nevertheless, the FTDA can be reasonably read to include 
tarnishment. 
The Lanham Act, as amended by the FTDA, provides that “[t]he 
owner of a famous mark shall be entitled . . . to an injunction against 
another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade 
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and 
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.”150 The Act 
further defines dilution as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous 
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the 
presence or absence of—(1) competition between the owner of the 
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, 
mistake, or deception.”151
1. The plain meaning rule 
Before conducting a textual analysis of the FTDA, it is worth 
noting that if there are two reasonable textual interpretations of the 
statutory language as it relates to tarnishment, the door is open for 
courts to look to the legislative history to determine whether the Act 
encompasses tarnishment.152 Chief Justice Marshall declared the age-
old principle that “[w]here there is no ambiguity . . . , there is no 
room for construction.”153 However, where the language of a statute 
is ambiguous, a court can and should look to the legislative history 
to properly interpret the provision in question.154 The Supreme 
FTDA definition “clearly encompasses the blurring type of harm recognized universally by the 
states”). 
 150. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). 
 151. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 152. See supra Part IV.A for a description of how federal courts have appealed to 
congressional intent to justify including tarnishment under the FTDA.  
 153. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 76, 95–96 (1820). Justice Marshall 
explained:  
The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. 
Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The 
case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a Court in departing from the 
plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of an intention which the 
words themselves did not suggest.  
Id. 
 154. See, e.g., Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (“As for 
the propriety of using legislative history at all, common sense suggests that inquiry benefits 
from reviewing additional information rather than ignoring it.”); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 
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Court has held that this principle applies in full force to situations, 
such as the tarnishment issue, where the scope of the legislation is in 
question: 
In these cases, as in so many others that come before us, we are 
called upon to determine the applicability of a statute where the 
language of the statute does not make crystal clear its intended 
scope. In all such cases we are compelled to resort to the legislative 
history to determine whether, in light of the articulated purposes of 
the legislation, Congress intended that the statute apply to the 
particular cases in question.155
Thus, if the scope of the FTDA is not clear from the text, or if 
“[w]hat Congress thought” is not clear from “the definition that 
Congress adopted,”156 courts are “compelled” to look to the 
legislative history for guidance.157
2. The textual argument against reading tarnishment into the FTDA 
Many commentators have argued that tarnishment should be 
read out of the FTDA.158 Prior to the Supreme Court’s comment in 
886, 896 (1984) (“Where . . . resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute and the 
intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language and then to the legislative history 
if the statutory language is unclear.”). 
 155. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 570 (1969). 
 156. Oral Argument, supra note 114, at *34. 
 157. This Subpart does not purport to be a comprehensive discussion of the plain 
meaning rule. It is worth noting, however, that as of late the Supreme Court has demonstrated 
an increased reluctance to rely upon legislative history in statutory interpretation.  Rickie 
Sonpal, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2192 (2003) 
(“Over the past decade or two, the United States Supreme Court has returned to a textual or 
plain meaning method of statutory interpretation. This ‘new textualism,’ perhaps most vocally 
championed by Justice Scalia but now accepted by an effective majority of the Court, largely 
limits the Court's interpretive resources to the text of the statute and the larger body of 
surrounding law.” (footnotes omitted)); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 
37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's 
Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133 (1992).   
 158. See, e.g., WELKOWITZ, supra note 48, at 260 (“A plain meaning approach to the 
definition also would suggest that tarnishment is not included in the definition of dilution.”); 
Edgecombe, supra note 1478, at 1279 (“To eliminate some of the confusion surrounding the 
dilution doctrine, tarnishment should no longer be actionable under the FTDA.”); Klieger, 
supra note 8, at 830 (“Unless senior users of a mark have an absolute right to control the mark 
and its associations, tarnishment without resulting consumer confusion should not be 
actionable.”). The Restatement of Unfair Competition also regards tarnishment as a claim 
separate from dilution. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c 
(1995). 
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Moseley, such arguments constituted little more than rhetoric. But 
having gained the preliminary backing of the highest court in the 
United States, the antitarnishment position has been strengthened 
significantly. The foundation for the argument against including 
tarnishment in the FTDA is that the tarnishment concept is 
dependent on the phrase “injury to business reputation.” Because 
that phrase is not included in the FTDA, in contrast to many state 
statutes, the FTDA arguably does not encompass tarnishment claims. 
This is the argument implied by Justice Stevens in Moseley when he 
commented, “[w]hether [tarnishment] is actually embraced by the 
statutory text . . . is another matter.”159
The argument against reading tarnishment into the FTDA also 
hinges on a narrow definition of the terms “identify” and 
“distinguish.” If the FTDA only encompasses dilution by blurring, 
then these terms must be interpreted as only applying to the source 
of the goods or services in question and not to their quality or 
image, because blurring deals primarily with a lessening of the 
capacity of a trademark to serve as a unique source identifier. 
3. Textual arguments for reading tarnishment into the FTDA 
The text of the FTDA’s definition of dilution can be reasonably 
interpreted to include dilution by tarnishment. Central to the textual 
argument for the inclusion of tarnishment is an interpretation of the 
terms “identify” and “distinguish” as not only referring to source, 
but also to quality and image of the goods or services in question. 
Merriam-Webster defines “identify” as “to establish the identity of”; 
it further defines “identity” as “sameness of essential or generic 
character in different examples or instances.”160 The quality of a 
good and the image associated with a good are both integral parts of 
the good’s “character” and thus its identity. The word “distinguish” 
means “to perceive as being separate or different” or to “recognize a 
difference in.”161 Neither the term “identify” nor the term 
“distinguish” lends itself exclusively to establishing or perceiving 
only origin or source. Rather, they refer equally to quality and 
image. Thus, a junior use that lessens the capacity of consumers to 
 159. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003). 
 160. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1123 (Philip Babcock Gove, 
Ph.D. ed., 2002).  
 161. Id. at 659. 
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perceive a difference in the quality of goods associated with a 
trademark fits within the dilution definition just as a use that lessens 
the public’s capacity to perceive a difference in the source or origin of 
the goods. 
Tarnishing junior uses of famous trademarks threaten to lessen 
the capacity of the marks to identify and distinguish the quality of or 
the image associated with the related goods and services. As 
Professor Welkowitz explains, a junior tarnishing use can cause 
consumers to see “the mark as sending conflicting signals about the 
quality of the goods or services provided by the single source.”162 
This impairs the ability of tarnished trademarks to serve as unique 
quality and image identifiers and thus lessens the capacity of the 
trademark to distinguish and identify the associated goods or 
services. Accordingly, tarnishment fits squarely within the FTDA 
definition of dilution. 
To illustrate, imagine that the previously discussed Kodak piano 
company produces shoddy pianos that cannot hold a tune. Once the 
buying public discovers that the keys on the Kodak piano stick after 
minimal use, that the strings are incapable of staying tuned for more 
than two months, or that the wood paneling is apt to fall off with the 
slightest stress, the enraged consumers will likely associate the Kodak 
label with sub par merchandise. The Kodak name, along with the 
accompanying goodwill, is tarnished as consumers begin to associate 
it with poor-quality goods. The piano maker’s use of the Kodak 
mark lessens the mark’s capacity to identify and distinguish the 
quality of goods bearing the famous mark. This injury thus falls 
within the FTDA definition of dilution. 
This very reasoning was applied in a recent federal district court 
decision. In Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, 
S.A.,163 the Southern District of Florida heard a case in which Four 
Seasons Hotels had licensed the defendant to operate a hotel under 
the Four Seasons name in Caracas, Venezuela.164 In constructing and 
managing the hotel, the defendant failed to comply with Four 
Seasons Hotels’ quality control standards established in the licensing 
agreement.165 Due to the hotel’s “substandard nature, incomplete 
 162. WELKOWITZ, supra note 48, at 259. 
 163. 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 164. Id. at 1272.  
 165. Id. at 1274–76. 
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construction and inferior furnishings,” guests complained that the 
hotel “wasn’t a Four Seasons.” 166 Its reputation being thus 
damaged, Four Seasons Hotels filed suit against the defendant 
licensees, alleging, among other claims, tarnishment of the Four 
Seasons trademark.167 The Federal District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida held that the defendant’s failure to comply with 
the quality control standards “diminished the capacity of the mark to 
distinguish the high quality of Plaintiffs’ services.”168 Thus, the court 
looked to the quality-representation function of the Four Seasons 
trademark and held that a lessening of the capacity of a mark to 
distinguish the Four Seasons Hotels’ services from services of a lower 
quality constituted actionable dilution. 
4. Dilution under the FTDA should be read to encompass tarnishment 
The argument that tarnishment claims are dependent on the 
phrase “injury to business reputation” is dangerously attractive 
because of its simplicity. Tarnishment clearly falls within the “injury 
to business reputation” categorization and thus is obviously a valid 
claim under the many state statutes that include that phrase.169 
However, the fact that tarnishment involves an “injury to business 
reputation” and the fact that this phrase is not included in the 
definition of dilution do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
the FTDA does not encompass tarnishment. To conclude that 
tarnishment is not actionable under the FTDA requires showing that 
tarnishment does not lessen “the capacity of a famous mark to 
identify and distinguish related goods or services.”170 However, as 
discussed above, dilution by tarnishment does cause the injury 
 166. Id. at 1332. 
 167. Id. at 1327. Even though dilution was developed in part to respond to the need for 
protection against junior uses of famous trademarks on nonrelated products, dilution applies 
equally to uses on products in direct competition with one another. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) 
(“The term ‘dilution’ means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of . . . competition between 
the owner of the famous mark and other parties.” (emphasis added)); see also Nabisco, Inc. v. 
PF Brands, Inc. 191 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir. 1999) (arguing that the fact that the products are 
in direct competition with each other increases the probability of a reduction in distinctiveness 
because it increases the likelihood that consumers will be exposed to both products), overruled 
in part by Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 168. Four Seasons Hotels, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1332. 
 169. See supra note 79. 
 170. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
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described in the FTDA’s definition of dilution.171 Thus, the 
exclusion of the phrase “injury to business reputation” from the 
FTDA is not fatal to tarnishment claims. 
Moreover, the broader interpretation of the terms “identify” and 
“distinguish,” to the inclusion of quality and image, is consistent 
with the function of trademarks. “One of the classic functions of a 
trademark is to signify that all goods or services sold under the mark 
are of equal quality.”172 The inclusion of the concepts of quality and 
image within the phrase “the capacity of a famous mark to identify 
and distinguish goods or services” allows trademark owners to 
ensure that goods and services sold under their trademark are of a 
similar quality and are consistent with a desired image.173 “[T]he 
right to control the quality of the goods manufactured and sold 
under the holder’s trademark” is “[o]ne of the most valuable and 
important protections afforded by the Lanham Act.”174 Viewing the 
definition of dilution in the context of the purposes that trademarks 
fulfill thus supports a broad reading of the FTDA, to the inclusion of 
tarnishment.
At oral argument, when the Court heard the Mosely appeal, one 
justice argued that in order for dilution to protect the quality-
representation function of trademarks, the word “quality” would 
actually need to be added to the dilution definition.175 Section 1127 
would thus presumably read: “the term ‘dilution’ means the 
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish 
[the quality of] goods or services.”176 By the same reasoning, 
however, for the dilution definition to encompass blurring, the word 
“origin” would need to be added to § 1127, thus defining dilution 
 171. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 172. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:95 (arguing that the FTDA “can and should be 
read to include tarnishment”); see also Klieger, supra note 8, at 802 (describing the quality-
representation function of trademarks). 
 173. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:95. 
 174. El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 
1986). 
 175. At oral argument, Mr. Dellinger made the following comment: “If [a trademark] no 
longer stands in one’s mind, or in the mind and the public perception for the same 
connotation of quality as it did before the association with the unsavory image, its capacity to 
identify and distinguish that quality has lessened . . . .” Oral Argument, supra note 114, at 
*34. One justice interrupted Mr. Dellinger: “But you have to add the word quality to the 
statute.” Id. Another justice clarified that “[t]he statute doesn’t contain that word.” Id.  
 176. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). The bracketed words represent hypothetical additions to 
the original. 
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as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish [the origin of] goods or services.”177 Congress, however, 
included neither the word “quality” nor the word “origin” in its 
dilution definition. Because the terms “identify” and “distinguish” 
include the concept of both origin and quality, and because 
representation of quality is an important function of trademarks, § 
1127 should be interpreted to protect the capacity of trademarks to 
identify and distinguish both the origin and the quality of goods and 
services. 
Professor Welkowitz also argues against the inclusion of 
tarnishment within the definition of dilution: 
Although the blurring concept can be fit into the Lanham Act 
definition (though it is by no means a perfect fit), the tarnishment 
concept does not as readily fit the FTDA definition of dilution. A 
tarnishing use may take advantage of the fame of the trademark, 
but it normally does not seek to diminish the ability of a famous 
mark to distinguish goods or services. In fact, a tarnishing use 
depends on the continuing public association of the famous mark 
with a unique source of goods or services in order for the second 
user’s deprecating commentary to be understood.178
This argument suffers from two weaknesses. First, it assumes that 
the limited interpretation of the terms “identify” and “distinguish” 
only apply to source and not to quality or image. Secondly, it 
mistakenly relies on the intent of the tarnishing user of the mark. 
While intent of the junior user may be a factor in determining 
whether dilution exists,179 the FTDA is ultimately concerned with 
whether the junior use causes dilution and not with the intent of the 
junior user. For example, even though the success of 
barbiesplaypen.com may depend on the distinctiveness of the Barbie 
name, the website still threatens to lessen the capacity of the Barbie 
mark to serve as a unique source identifier. Thus, even though the 
operators of the adult website may not intend to blur the Barbie 
mark, the website threatens to do just that. 
 177. Id. The bracketed words represent hypothetical additions to the original. 
 178. WELKOWITZ, supra note 48, at 234. 
 179. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 225 (2d Cir. 1999) (weighing 
predatory intent as a factor in a dilution claim), overruled in part by Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 
(2003). 
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5. The correct conclusion 
Regardless of which of the foregoing textual arguments is most 
persuasive, the analysis reveals one important conclusion: the text is 
ambiguous. Specifically, there are two plausible interpretations of the 
text as it applies to tarnishment claims, each of which yields a 
differing conclusion. This one fact opens the door for courts to look 
to the legislative history of the FTDA to determine its scope. In 
Moseley, the Supreme Court did not conduct a full analysis of the 
tarnishment issue because the validity of a tarnishment claim was not 
questioned on appeal.180 If and when the Court revisits the issue 
because of the ambiguity in the dilution definition with respect to 
tarnishment,181 the Court should take its analysis one step further 
than it did in Moseley and look to the intent behind the FTDA. The 
legislative history clearly reveals that Congress fully intended the 
FTDA to encompass tarnishment,182 even though it failed to insert 
the usual “injury to business reputation” phrase into the text. That 
history should persuade the Court to uphold the validity of dilution 
by tarnishment under the FTDA. 
V. CONCLUSION 
At first blush, Congress’s failure to include “injury to business 
reputation” in the FTDA seems to conflict with Congress’s intent 
that the Act “encompass all forms of dilution recognized by the 
courts, including dilution . . . by tarnishment . . . .”183 Dilution, 
however, is an “amorphous concept”184 and the FTDA definition can 
be reasonably interpreted to include tarnishment claims because 
tarnishment threatens the capacity of famous trademarks to identify 
and distinguish the image or quality of the associated goods or 
 180. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003). 
 181. In all actuality, the ambiguity surrounding the dilution definition in the FTDA 
extends far beyond tarnishment. See, e.g., Magliocca, supra note 15, at 953 (2001) (“This 
battle for supremacy within trademark law is aggravated by the vagueness of the dilution 
concept. Courts repeatedly throw up their hands in frustration when asked ‘to identify the legal 
interest sought to be protected from “dilution” . . . .’” (quoting Ringling Bros.-Barnum & 
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 
1999)). 
 182. See supra Part III.D. 
 183. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1035. 
 184. Klieger, supra note 8, at 794 (“Dilution is an amorphous concept, and no 
antidilution statute addresses exactly what dilution is or how it can be proven.”). 
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services. Moreover, the presence of ambiguity in the definition of 
tarnishment—as it relates to tarnishment— opens the door for courts 
to look to the legislative history of the FTDA to interpret the scope 
of the Act. This history clearly shows that Congress fully intended 
the FTDA to encompass dilution by tarnishment. Thus, contrary to 
the Supreme Court’s preliminary comment in Moseley, a textual 
analysis of the FTDA, supported by the legislative history, supports 
the inclusion of tarnishment as a valid claim under the federal Act. 
Layne T. Smith 
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